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Corporate tax incentives are one of the most important instruments used by governments 
to attract inward FDI flows. By lowering corporate tax rates countries raise the 
profitability of FDI and thus increase their attractiveness as a location. However, 
multinationals can also lower their tax burden by lending to the foreign subsidiary to 
finance the investment since interest payments made by the subsidiary are not subject to 
taxation. This means that any profits the subsidiary makes can be repatriated back to the 
parent tax free in the form of interest payments and the incentive to use debt finance 
should be increasing in the host country tax rate. However, if the home government 
operates a tax credit system, taxing repatriated profits at a rate equal to the difference 
between the taxes paid on those profits abroad and the domestic tax rate, there will be no 
net gain for the parent company. Therefore, the rules regarding the taxation of foreign 
income can potentially eliminate the incentive to use debt finance to shield foreign 
income from taxation. 
 
In this study we estimate the importance of interest tax shields for foreign subsidiaries, 
and the importance of foreign income tax rules. We use data on over 8,500 subsidiaries 
within the EU, which allows us to look at the total amount of investment in each 
subsidiary, and determine the proportion of this investment that is financed by debt (the 
leverage ratio). The wide variety of corporate tax rates within the EU means that we can 
compare the leverage ratios of foreign subsidiaries in a variety of corporate tax rate 
jurisdictions. We use regression analysis to estimate how sensitive leverage ratios are to 
corporate tax rates, whilst controlling for a number of individual subsidiary 
characteristics.  
 
Our results indicate that 10 per cent higher corporate tax rates are associated with 3.5 per 
cent greater subsidiary leverage ratios. However, if the home country operates a tax credit 
system our estimates suggest that this positive relationship disappears.      
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The vast increase in foreign assets globally has raised interest in how the home country 
should tax profits flowing from these investments. Broadly speaking, countries have 
chosen either to exempt foreign income from taxation or to subject foreign income to 
taxation with credits/deductions given for foreign taxes paid. Recent research has focused 
on the effect of these foreign income tax rules on the relationship between aggregate FDI 
flows and corporate tax rates. In this paper we examine how foreign income tax rules can 
affect the financial structure of subsidiary-level FDI in Europe. The tax-deductibility of 
interest payments suggests that higher (host-country) corporate tax rates should be 
associated with a greater proportion of debt-financed FDI, as foreign income tax credit 
systems should, in theory, limit the benefits of shielding foreign income from host 
country taxation. Our results indicate that whilst multinationals from tax exemption 
countries adjust the financial structure of foreign investments in response to corporate tax 
rates, the effect of corporate tax rates is insignificant for FDI originating from tax credit 
countries. These results reveal an additional channel through which foreign income tax 
credit systems attenuate the forces of tax competition. 
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Recent research in international taxation has focused on the optimal design of foreign 
income tax rules
1. This research has been prompted by the huge growth in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the consequent rise in profits earned abroad. For example, Huizinga 
and Nicodème (2005) investigate how host countries tax the increasing share of profits 
earned by the foreign-owned sector. The home country must also decide how to tax 
income earned abroad. Home countries typically choose between exempting foreign 
income from taxation or taxing foreign income at the home country rate and granting 
foreign tax credits or deductions for foreign taxes paid. The choice of foreign income tax 
rules is important. Recent studies have found that foreign income tax credit systems result 
in significant welfare losses for countries (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2001). Clausing 
(2004) has shown that tax credit countries collect more revenue than countries that adopt 
a tax exemption system, while, Bénassy-Quéré et al (2005) demonstrate how tax credit 
systems can serve as a brake on tax competition.  In this paper we investigate how foreign 
income tax rules can influence the financial structure of FDI.   
 
Empirical research has provided ample evidence on the sensitivity of aggregate 
FDI to corporate tax rates (see Ederveen and de Mooij, 2003). In addition, some recent 
studies have compared the effects of different foreign income tax rules on the size of 
bilateral aggregate FDI flows (see Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2004). Corporate taxation, 
however, is not only important in explaining the geographic dispersion of foreign owned 
assets, but is also a potentially important determinant of the financial structure of FDI. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the recent exchanges between: Desai and Hines (2004); Grubert (2005); Desai and 
Hines (2005).  
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The financial structure of FDI can be decomposed into a mix of equity, retained earnings 
and loans. Few countries report a complete disaggregation of FDI positions and currently 
cross-country comparisons are only possible by comparing equity and reinvested earnings 
together against intra-company loans
2. Table 1 illustrates the financial structure of FDI in 
European countries over the period 1994-2002. The average structure of European FDI 
indicates that just under 75 per cent is funded by equity and re-invested earnings, the 
remaining is financed by intra-company loans. However, the overall average masks 
significant cross-country heterogeneity in the components of FDI. For example, 53 per 
cent of German FDI is composed of intra-company loans, whilst in Ireland equity and re-
invested earnings account for over 97 per cent of total FDI. The heterogeneous financial 
structure of FDI across countries may be explained by differences in corporate tax rates. 
Specifically, because interest payments on loans can shield profits from corporate 
taxation one might expect FDI in high tax countries to be composed predominantly of 
intra-company loans. Hence, the contrast between Germany and Ireland may be explained 
by high corporate tax rates in Germany compared to the low tax rates in Ireland. Clearly 
there is less incentive to use interest tax shields when corporate tax rates are low.  
 
In addition to the corporate tax rate, the rules governing the taxation of foreign 
income may be a significant determinant of the financial structure of FDI. FDI 
originating from countries operating foreign income tax-exemption rules are likely to 
feature a higher proportion of debt finance, as profits shielded from taxation abroad will 
not be subject to additional taxation upon repatriation. In contrast, the financial structure 
                                                 
2 The stock of equity and re-invested earnings is the value of the own capital of the enterprise, including the 
value accumulated from past re-invested earnings. Intra-company loans are the stock of debts between 
direct investors and the direct investment enterprise.  
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of FDI originating from countries that adopt foreign income tax credit rules may be less 
sensitive to corporate tax rates.  This is because credit systems tax worldwide income, 
granting credits only for foreign taxes paid. Foreign income repatriated home is subject to 
repatriation taxes equal to the difference between the home country tax liability and the 
amount of foreign taxes paid. Therefore, income that has been shielded from taxation 
abroad will be liable for higher repatriation taxes. Since this postpones any net tax saving, 
the result is that there may be no deterministic relationship between host country 
corporate tax rates and the financial structure of FDI from tax credit countries
3. 
 
In this paper we use financial data at the subsidiary level to examine the financial 
structure of foreign-owned assets. The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence 
on how corporate tax rates and corporate tax rules affect the financial composition of FDI 
in European countries. In this respect, we make two main contributions. Firstly, we 
investigate whether the financial structure of FDI is sensitive to different corporate tax 
rates. This tests the results of the extant literature in an international context and checks 
the robustness of these results using a variety of tax rate measures. Secondly, we provide 
new evidence on how foreign income tax rules may affect the tax-minimising behaviour 
of multinationals. By identifying the country of origin of each subsidiary, we can estimate 
the importance of foreign income tax rules in determining the financial structure of FDI 
originating from contrasting foreign income tax systems. This study is the first to directly 
                                                 
3 Classifying foreign income tax systems as either credit or exemption is not always immediately clear, 
however, it is possible to broadly classify countries as either exempting foreign income or operating a tax 
credit system. In the case of a credit system, there may be instances when there exists a net tax advantage to 
using debt finance for FDI– we discuss this more fully in the next section.  
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estimate the impact of contrasting foreign income tax rules on multinational firm-level 
data. 
 
Our results confirm recent research findings that corporate taxation is an 
important determinant of the financial structure of FDI. The econometric evidence 
suggests that 10 per cent higher taxes lead to a 3.4 per cent higher proportion of debt 
financed FDI. Our results prove robust to a variety of corporate tax rate measures and 
cross-country validation. However, this result is dependent on the international tax rules 
adopted by the home country. As expected, when the country of origin adopts foreign 
income tax credit rules it appears to eliminate the incentive for its FDI enterprises to use 
debt-financed FDI to shield foreign income. In contrast, the estimates for FDI originating 
from countries operating tax exemption rules support the hypothesis that multinationals 
can effectively shield profits from corporate taxation by using debt financed FDI. This 
provides evidence on the effectiveness of foreign income tax rules in securing corporate 
tax revenue for credit countries and indicates that FDI from tax-exemption countries can 
be optimally financed to reduce foreign tax liabilities in high tax countries, relieving 
pressure on the so called ‘race to the bottom’ in statutory corporate tax rates
4. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the extant 
literature on the how corporate taxation affects FDI and the limited evidence on how 
corporate taxation affects the financial structure of FDI. Section 3 describes the 
AMADEUS dataset that we use in this study. In section 4 we present the estimation 
                                                 
4 For a recent review of this literature, see Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2003)  
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methodology and results that use a number of firm level controls and an interaction term 
to capture the effect of foreign income tax rules. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The literature 
A recent meta-analysis surveying the literature on how FDI responds to corporate 
taxation estimated an absolute mean elasticity of FDI to corporate tax rates of 3.3 per cent 
(Ederveen and de Mooij, 2003). This suggests that a 1 per cent increase in host country 
corporate tax rates leads to a 3.3 per cent decrease in FDI. There is, however, no 
consensus on how foreign income tax rules affect FDI. Slemrod (1990) compares the 
sensitivity of aggregate FDI flows distinguishing between credit and exemption 
countries; however, his results reveal no significant differences. Hines (1996), using a 
similar methodology to Slemrod (1990), finds that U.S. inward FDI flows originating 
from tax exemption countries are significantly more sensitive to U.S. statutory corporate 
tax rates than FDI originating from tax credit countries. More recently, Bénassy-Quéré et 
al (2005) explore this question using aggregate data on bilateral FDI flows between 11 
OECD countries from 1984-2000. They find that FDI flows respond asymmetrically to 
tax rate differentials between countries and that the effect of credit and exemption rules is 
important. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004), using U.S. multinational data, find that the 
location of affiliate assets is particularly sensitive to corporate tax rates within Europe, 
and they argue that this is indirect evidence on the effect of tax exemption systems 
common among European countries. 
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The aggregate statistics in Table 1 suggest that corporate tax rates may be 
important in determining the pattern of intra-company loans. Intra-company loans may be 
particularly sensitive to corporate tax rates as tax legislation allows the interest expense 
on loans to be deductible from profits before they are subject to corporate taxation. In the 
case of the multinational subsidiary, intra-company loans can be used to shield income 
from taxation in high corporate tax jurisdictions.  
 
Gropp and Kostial (2000) is the first study that attempts to examine the effect of 
corporate taxation on the components of FDI, and also integrate foreign income tax rules 
into the analysis. The data they use are highly aggregated, allowing them to distinguish 
only between debt and equity investment and re-invested earnings together. Furthermore, 
due to data availability problems they are limited to a study of FDI outflows only. They 
postulate that foreign affiliates ultimately owned in tax credit countries have a larger 
incentive to reinvest their earnings abroad (rather than repatriate them) relative to an 
affiliate from a tax exemption country. The results of their analysis reveal that the 
composition of FDI outflows exhibit different patterns for credit and exemption 
countries. Specifically, they find that affiliates from tax exemption countries invest more 
abroad, but are less likely to use re-invested earnings to fund this investment and much 
more likely to use a combination of debt and new equity
5.  They find that the composition 
of inward FDI flows is insensitive to corporate tax rates, and depends only on the foreign 
income tax rules adopted by the host country. 
 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately they are unable to disentangle whether they use more debt or more new equity.  
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It is not possible to control for many features of individual FDI decisions using 
aggregate data. At the subsidiary level we expect that higher host country corporate tax 
rates should be reflected in higher subsidiary leverage ratios
 6. There are, however, 
potential costs to increased subsidiary leverage in high tax rate countries. Singh and 
Hodder (2000) note that while borrowing can increase interest tax shields, it also 
increases costs such as the risk of loosing tax shields, financial distress as well as agency 
costs. Transaction costs may also be important in setting up such tax planning strategies, 
with economies of scale resulting in larger subsidiaries facing much lower costs of 
arranging an optimal leverage ratio. Furthermore, subsidiaries with large fixed asset 
investments may require the use of increased debt finance to fund investment irrespective 
of host country tax rates. Therefore, controlling for these subsidiary characteristics, will 
allow a more robust estimation of the effects of host country corporate taxation on the 
financial structure of subsidiary-level FDI. Recent survey evidence appears to corroborate 
these theoretical insights: nearly 80 per cent of multinational firms surveyed consider tax 




The problematic nature of aggregate FDI data coupled with the need to control for 
subsidiary level characteristics has meant that recent studies have used affiliate level data 
to investigate the relationship between corporate taxation and the financial structure of 
FDI. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) use U.S. data sourced from the Internal Revenue 
                                                 
6 See Chowdry and Nanda (1994) for a theoretical treatment 




Service for 1996 to investigate the sensitivity of affiliate debt-asset ratios to host country 
corporate tax rates. Using data on just under 6,000 U.S. affiliates, they find that 10 per 
cent higher host country tax rates lead to 3.9 per cent higher debt-asset ratios. Jog and 
Tang (2001) compare changes in the relative tax rates of the U.S. and Canada to the debt-
asset ratio of U.S. subsidiaries in Canada. They find that the increase in the Canadian tax 
rate over the period 1984-1994 correlated with an increase in the debt-asset ratios of 120 
U.S. affiliates in their sample. More recently, Desai, Foley and Hines (2003a) use over 
32,000 affiliate observations from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data for the 
years 1982, 1989 and 1994, to investigate the sensitivity of affiliate debt-asset ratios to 
host country corporate tax rates. They find that 10 per cent higher host country tax rates 
lead to 2.8 per cent higher debt-asset ratios. In the first contribution to the non-U.S. 
literature, Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) are unable to find evidence that debt-asset 
ratios are sensitive to corporate tax rates. They use data from the Deutsche Bundesbank 
FDI database to examine the financing patterns of German inward FDI. Similar to Jog 
and Tang (2001), Ramb and Weichenrieder use a measure of the tax rate difference 
between the home country of the affiliate and the German tax rate. They estimate the 
effect of the tax rate difference on the use of intra-company loans by almost 10,000 
foreign subsidiaries over the period 1996-2001. They are, however, unable to uncover 
any statistically significant relationship.  
 
  Until now, the literature has not considered the effect of foreign income tax rules 
on the benefits of altering the financial structure of FDI in order to shield foreign income 
from corporate taxation. Under a credit system, a parent company that structures  
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investment in a subsidiary to shield foreign income from host country taxation will incur 
higher repatriation taxes when transferred home. As a result, the parent company from the 
credit country will be indifferent between financing the foreign subsidiary through re-
invested profits, debt and equity finance. However, if the parent company is located in an 
exemption country, income shielded from taxation abroad can be repatriated home 
without attracting additional taxes. The multinational firm resident in a foreign income 
tax-exemption country can realise the tax savings it has made by optimally financing the 
foreign investment.  In reality, thin capitalization rules will limit the extent to which 
subsidiaries from exemption countries can shield income using intra-company loans; and, 
the use of deferral and the limited foreign tax credits may give some advantage to using 
debt finance for subsidiaries from credit countries. In this paper, we examine use data at 
the subsidiary-level to estimate the importance of foreign income tax rules in determining 
the relationship between the financial structure of foreign subsidiary investments and host 
country corporate tax rates. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
The data 
We use the AMADEUS (Analyse Major Databases from European Sources) dataset 
comprising financial and ownership data on incorporated companies operating in 
Europe
8. Bureau Van Dyke compiles the AMADEUS database from company accounts 
filed under legal obligations in European countries. The financial data are supplemented 
using information from company reports and direct communications with the individual 
                                                 
8 For recent studies using AMADEUS see Huizinga and Nicodème (2005) and Desai (2003)  
 13 
companies. In total, AMADEUS contains financial and ownership data on over 1.5 
million companies, an estimated 98 per cent coverage of all companies incorporated in 
Europe. The observations are standardised (both in currency and definition) across all 
countries so that items in the profit and loss and balance sheet are directly comparable for 
every entity.  
 
From the AMADEUS database we identify foreign subsidiaries using the standard 
OECD definition
9. There is a total of 314, 516 foreign subsidiaries identified in 
AMADEUS. From these we select only those which file unconsolidated accounts so that 
the subsidiary’s operations can be separately identified from the multinational firm as a 
whole. For our analysis, the subsidiary must also have a complete record of the financial 
data over the period 2000-2003
10.  Applying this rule, the final sample size is just under 
8,500 foreign subsidiaries observed annually over four years across 16 European 
countries.  
 
It is important that this dataset is representative of multinational activity in the 
respective countries. To check this we cross-validated the dataset with aggregate statistics 
from the OECD Measuring Globalisation database
11. The OECD database has aggregate 
country-level statistics on the number of foreign subsidiaries and the distribution of 
                                                 
9 A foreign direct investment subsidiary is an incorporated enterprise in which the foreign owner controls 
directly or indirectly (through another subsidiary) more than 50 per cent of the shareholders’ voting power 
(OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 3
rd Edition) 
10 Specifically, the subsidiary must have recorded the following items in each year between 2000-2003: 
Total Assets; Current Liabilities: loans; Non-Current Liabilities: long-term debt; Tangible Fixed Assets; 
EBITDA; Operating Revenue; and NAICS (2002) industry code. 
 
11 See Gomez-Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti (2004) for a similar cross-validation exercise using the 
AMADEUS database  
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employment in these subsidiaries across 9 industry categories. We aggregated our 
AMADEUS data subset on number of subsidiaries and employment into the same 
industry categories and compared them with the OECD data using a rank correlation 
coefficient. For the majority of countries this returned a correlation coefficient of greater 
than 0.9, and in most cases it exceeded 0.99. The high correlation coefficient indicates 
that our sample is representative of multinational activity in our sample of European 
countries. 
 
  In addition to the subsidiary level dataset we also require country level data on 
corporate tax rates and the foreign income tax rules (credit or exemption). For corporate 
tax rates we use the data provided by Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002). This dataset 
comprises a range of corporate tax measures and offers a number of advantages in 
checking the robustness of our analysis. Whilst statutory tax rates are perhaps the most 
familiar they may not capture the incentives present in tax systems
12. Two alternative 
approaches attempt to provide the effective corporate tax rate applicable in each country. 
The most common effective tax rate measure found in this literature is that described in 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2001). This measure calculates the tax paid by each firm as a 
percentage of its pre-tax profits. The median tax rate of firms in each country is then 
derived from the firm-level tax rates, and this is used as an estimate of the actual 
corporate tax rate in that jurisdiction. By calculating the tax rate using the actual data on 
taxes paid by subsidiaries, this tax rate measure attempts to capture some of the 
                                                 
12 Variations in the definition of taxable items and the scope of the tax base will not be captured by the 
statutory tax rate 
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incentives present in the tax code of the particular country. Because these tax rates are 
calculated using actual tax and profit data, they are referred to as ex-post tax rates.  
 
An alternative approach is to calculate the effective tax rate on a hypothetical investment 
project. This tax rate measure captures the incentives present in the tax code of the 
particular country in which the investment is being made, by modeling the specific 
features of the tax code in that jurisdiction. These ex ante tax rates were pioneered by 
King and Fullerton (1983) and more recently developed and updated by Devereux, 
Griffith and Klemm (2002)
13.  In this study we use both measures of effective tax rates as 
well as the statutory tax rates, thereby testing  the robustness of our results to different tax 
rate measures. For a review of the relative merits of each measure of corporate taxation 
see Nicodème (2001). Finally, we use the PriceWaterhouseCoopers Worldwide Tax 




In order to obtain estimates of the effect of corporate taxation on the financial structure of 
FDI, we estimate an OLS panel data model of the form: 
 
Yit = β1TAXjt + β2SIZEit + β3TANGit + β4PROFITit  + cm +  vit   (1) 
 
The dependent variable (Yit) is the leverage ratio of the individual subsidiary (i) in each 
year (t).  It is defined as the ratio of short and long-term debt to total assets at the 
                                                 
13 These effective tax rates estimates are available at www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210  
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subsidiary, thus capturing the proportion of the total investment financed by debt. Using 
this measure has the additional advantage of allowing us to directly compare our results 
with previous studies.  The most important explanatory variable is the corporate tax rate 
(TAXjt) for each country (j) in each year (t).  
 
The theoretical literature suggests that we use a number of controls to account for 
subsidiary heterogeneity. We control for the size of the subsidiary measured as the log of 
operating revenue (SIZEit) to capture the effect of economies of scale that may allow 
some subsidiaries to adapt financial structure more easily to corporate tax rates. We also 
control for the profitability of the subsidiary (PROFITit) which is measured as the ratio of 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets. 
Less profitable subsidiaries may prefer lower leverage ratios to avoid the costs of 
financial distress and the risk of losing tax shields. Finally, subsidiaries with large 
investments in fixed assets may require substantial financing necessitating the use of 
increased debt finance. This effect is controlled for by including the proportion of 
subsidiary tangible fixed assets to total assets (TANGit).  
 
We use Cm  to represent a vector of fixed effects. Our estimates include fixed effects for 
the parent company, the industry of the affiliate and the year. By employing a parent 
company fixed effect, we can control for unobserved heterogeneity between multinational 
firms subsidiary leverage policies. For example, some multinational groups may have 
specific preferences over financial structure that we cannot observe; however, by 
including the parent company fixed effect we can control for this unobserved  
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heterogeneity when we estimate the sensitivity of the financial structure of FDI to 
corporate taxation. The industry fixed effect controls for inter-industry differences in 
leverage ratios, and the year effect controls for year-specific effects. vgti  is an independent 
error term. 
 
  Contrasting foreign income tax rules can lead to differences in the sensitivity of 
subsidiary leverage to corporate taxation. To capture this we use an interaction term 
(CREDIT) that is set equal to 1 if the subsidiary is from a foreign income tax credit 
country, and zero otherwise.  
 
Yit = β1TAXjt + β2(CREDIT*TAXjt)  + β3SIZEit + β4TANGit + β5PROFITit  + cm +  vit    (2) 
    
This allows us to estimate separately the effects of corporate tax rates on the financial 
structure of FDI from countries that exempt foreign income compared to those which 
operate a foreign income tax credit system. Our intuition suggests that the coefficient on 
the interaction term will be negative; a negative coefficient would indicate that the 
sensitivity of leverage ratios of the subset of subsidiaries ultimately owned in tax credit 
countries will be less sensitive to taxation compared to the complete sample. In the next 
section we estimate equations 1 and 2, and test the robustness of our estimates using a 





We first estimate how the financial structure of FDI responds to corporate tax rates, and 
then test whether foreign income tax rules influence this relationship. Figure 1 provides 
some suggestive evidence on how corporate tax rates affect the financial structure of FDI 
at an aggregate level. The figure plots the average leverage of foreign subsidiaries against 
the country-level effective tax rate. The regression line suggests that higher corporate tax 
rates are correlated with a higher proportion of debt financed FDI. The benefit of using 
micro-level data is that we can control for various subsidiary characteristics and provide 
more robust results.  
 
In Table 2 we present regression results using subsidiary level data. The 
dependent variable is the leverage ratio of each subsidiary, measured as the ratio of 
subsidiary long and short-term debt to total subsidiary assets. Column (1) presents the 
results of regressing the subsidiary leverage ratio against the ex-post corporate tax rate 
faced by each subsidiary in each year. The estimated coefficient on the corporate tax rate 
variables is positive and significant, indicating that a 10 per cent increase in corporate 
taxation leads to a 3.5 per cent increase in subsidiary leverage ratios. The magnitude of 
tax-rate effect is in line with the current literature discussed earlier. In Column (2) we 
control for subsidiary characteristics discussed earlier. The results in Column (2) indicate 
that the relationship between the financial structure of FDI and corporate tax rates is 
robust to controlling for individual subsidiary characteristics. 
 
One difficulty of interpreting the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) is that they do 
not control for unobservable non-tax determinants of subsidiary leverage. For example,  
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subsidiaries owned by the same parent company may all share a common unobserved 
characteristic that is not controlled for in the previous OLS estimates. Therefore, in 
Column (3) we report estimates using Equation 1 which includes a full set of industry, 
year and parent company fixed effects. The estimate of the tax sensitivity in Column (3) 
is not affected by the unobserved effects relating to the industry of the subsidiary, the 
particular year of the observation, or the characteristics pertaining to the particular 
multinational parent. While the addition of these fixed effects reduces the sample size as 
the parent company is not always identifiable, the tax rate coefficient remains highly 
significant in all cases. 
 
Table 3 presents results using a variety of tax rate measures that allows us to test 
the robustness of the corporate tax effect. In Column (1) we use the statutory tax rate as 
the explanatory variable, including the control variables and the fixed effects used earlier. 
The coefficient estimate indicates that while the leverage ratio is slightly less sensitive to 
the statutory tax rate, the relationship remains highly significant. Column (2) reports 
estimates using the ex-post tax rate measure, replicating the results presented in Table 2. 
In Column (3) we use the ex-ante average effective tax rates calculated by Devereux, 
Griffith and Klemm (2002). The ex-ante tax rate coefficient is comparable in magnitude 
to the ex-post tax rate coefficient presented in Column (2), and importantly the 
relationship remains highly significant.  These results reveal that subsidiary leverage 




Finally we test whether the nature of foreign income tax rules affect the 
relationship between corporate taxation and the financial structure of FDI at the 
subsidiary level. In Table 4 we estimate Equation 2 which uses an interaction variable to 
capture how the effect of the corporate tax rate varies according to tax-rules adopted by 
the country of ultimate owner. The earlier discussion suggests that foreign income tax 
credit rules will decrease the sensitivity of leverage ratios to corporate tax rates, and our 
results support this hypothesis. Columns (1) to (3) estimate how the effect of corporate 
tax rates vary according to the tax rules adopted by each country for the three different 
tax rate measures. In each case, the interaction variable has a negative co-efficient 
indicating that foreign income tax credit rules reduce the sensitivity of leverage ratios to 
corporate tax rates. For example, in Column (3) the effect of foreign income tax credit 
rules reduces the sensitivity of subsidiary leverage to statutory corporate tax rates to only 
0.07. The magnitude and significance of the interaction variable coefficient suggests that 
the tax rules adopted by a country can potentially eliminate the advantage of using debt-
financed FDI
14. These results reveal that the interaction of corporate tax rules and 
corporate tax rates is an important determinant of the financial structure of FDI.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The increasing share of profits that are earned abroad has raised interest in the design of 
foreign income tax rules. By locating operations in low tax rate countries, multinational 
                                                 
14 In Appendix A.1 we present the results of a cross-validation exercise that sequentially drops one country 
in turn from the sample and re-estimates the model. The results of this robustness exercise are 
unambiguous: the coefficient on corporate tax changes only marginally and it remains significant at the 1 
per cent level in each scenario. In addition, the negative effect of foreign income tax credit rules is 
consistent across the sample. 
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firms can lower their tax liabilities. This tax competition has led governments to worry 
over their ability to generate corporate tax revenue. Recent research suggests that foreign 
income tax credit rules may serve as a brake on tax competition. Multinationals, however, 
can finance FDI optimally and reduce corporate tax liabilities without any change of 
location. Aggregate statistics show significant heterogeneity in the financing pattern of 
FDI. Our subsidiary level analysis reveals that corporate taxation is an important 
determinant of how FDI is financed. However, in congruence with recent research, we 
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Table 1.   
Worldwide FDI positions in EU-15 countries, 1994-2002 
      
    
    
Country 
% Equity and re-
invested earnings  % Loans 
    
EU-15 Average  73.7 26.3 
    
Austria  92.6 7.4 
Denmark
1  73.1 26.9 
Finland  77.2 22.8 
France  72.2 27.8 
Germany  47.4 52.6 
Ireland
2  97.9 2.1 
Italy
3  - - 
Luxembourg
4  87.7 12.3 
Netherlands  53.5 46.5 
Norway
5  66.9 33.1 
Portugal
6  83 17 
Spain  82 18 
Sweden  71.4 28.6 
Switzerland
7  - - 
United Kingdom  78.1 21.9 
    
    
 
1. Figures for 1995 and 1997 not reported 
2. Disaggregated data only available from 1998 onwards 
3. No disaggregation reported 
4. Only 2002 data available 
5. Disaggregated data only available from 1996 onwards 
6. All years except 1994 
7. No disaggregation reported from 1997 onwards and earlier figures inconsistent 
 
Source: Eurostat (europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/)  
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Table 2.               
The effect of corporate tax rates on subsidiary leverage 
      
 1  2  3 
Constant 0.47314 0.41827 0.36584 
 [0.00993]*** [0.01467]*** [0.04199]*** 
   
Tax rate  0.3474 0.30831 0.33534 
 [0.02837]*** [0.02859]*** [0.04096]*** 
   
Tangibility of assets - 
tangfixa/ta 
-0.11404 -0.03422 
 [0.00930]*** [0.01529]** 
   
Proxy for firm size - log(oprev)  0.0107 0.01733 
 [0.00110]*** [0.00179]*** 
   
Profitability of assets - ebitda/ta -0.13311 -0.06532 
 [0.05333]** [0.04399] 
   
Ultimate owner fixed effect?  YES 
   
Year fixed effect?  YES 
   
Industry fixed effect?  YES 
    
Observations 68922 68883 34580 
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.36 
   
Robust standard errors in brackets   




Table 3.                 
Testing the robustness of results using various corporate tax rate measures 
     
  1 2 3 
     
Constant 0.39758 0.36584  0.39202
 [0.04758]*** [0.04199]***  [0.04776]***
   
Statutory tax rate  0.23769  
 [0.07041]***  
Hines tax rate  0.33534 
 [0.04096]*** 
EATR    0.31171
   [0.08805]***
   
Tangibility of assets - tangfixa/ta -0.03715 -0.03422  -0.03857
 [0.01543]** [0.01529]**  [0.01533]**
   
Proxy for firm size - log(oprev) 0.01711 0.01733  0.01698
 [0.00180]*** [0.00179]***  [0.00180]***
   
Profitability of assets - ebitda/ta -0.06504 -0.06532 -0.0649
 [0.04380] [0.04399]  [0.04370]
   
Ultimate owner fixed effect?  YES YES  YES
Year fixed effect?  YES YES  YES
Industry fixed effect?  YES YES  YES
   
Observations 34580 34580  34580
R-squared 0.35 0.36  0.35
   
Robust standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 
 




Table 4.            
The effect of foreign income tax credit rules on subsidiary leverage 
      
   1  2  3 
  Hines Tax Rate  EATR tax rate  Statutory tax 
rate 
   
Constant 0.36608 0.39463  0.39807
 [0.04197]*** [0.04758]***  [0.04748]***
   
Tangibility of assets - tangfixa/ta -0.03393 -0.03836  -0.03697
 [0.01529]** [0.01532]**  [0.01542]**
   
Proxy for firm size - log(oprev) 0.0173 0.01697  0.01706
 [0.00179]*** [0.00180]***  [0.00180]***
   
Profitability of assets - ebitda/ta -0.06518 -0.06475 -0.06485
 [0.04393] [0.04365]  [0.04372]
      
Hines tax rate  0.37567  
 [0.04991]***  
Hines tax rate slope dummy  -0.12338  
 [0.08501]  
   
EATR (Devereux, 2003)    0.46118 
 [0.10681]*** 
EATR slope dummy  -0.48184 
 [0.17942]*** 
   
Statutory tax rate    0.31986
   [0.08547]***
Statutory tax rate slope dummy    -0.25226
   [0.13851]*
   
Ultimate Owner, Industry and Year fixed 
effects? 
YES YES YES
   
Observations 34580 34580  34580
R-squared 0.36 0.36  0.35
   
Robust standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
  
 29 






















.1  .2 .3 .4 .5
Country tax rate
(mean) leverage Fitted values 
Corporate tax rates and affiliate leverage in 2002 
IE



































.1  .2 .3 .4 .5
Country tax rate
(mean) leverage Fitted values 


































.1  .2 .3 .4 .5
Country tax rate
(mean) leverage Fitted values 
















Appendix A.1.   
Cross-country validation 
  
Country dropped:  Germany  U.K. France Italy Portugal Spain Austria Belgium
  
Constant 0.38373  0.36925 0.35192 0.22106 0.36696 0.36404 0.36808 0.40412
 [0.04185]***  [0.04631]***[0.05875]***[0.04620]***[0.04213]***[0.04530]***[0.04203]***[0.04362]***
  
ETR 0.33877  0.49372 0.39885 0.82733 0.38429 0.39477 0.37812 0.26847
 [0.04949]***  [0.05137]***[0.05451]***[0.08345]***[0.04953]***[0.05092]***[0.04957]***[0.05212]***
  
TANG -0.04043  -0.05876 -0.00595 -0.0203 -0.03427 -0.02515 -0.03397 -0.05031
 [0.01534]***  [0.01766]*** [0.01794] [0.01583] [0.01541]** [0.01612] [0.01528]**[0.01618]***
  
SIZE 0.0177  0.01559 0.01532 0.01925 0.01712 0.01806 0.01731 0.0156
 [0.00181]***  [0.00198]***[0.00233]***[0.00187]***[0.00180]***[0.00194]***[0.00180]***[0.00188]***
  
PROFIT -0.06582  -0.19073 -0.04249 -0.06092 -0.06409 -0.05486 -0.06537 -0.05847
 [0.04465]  [0.01970]*** [0.03334] [0.04227] [0.04340] [0.03878] [0.04414] [0.04115]
  
Credit slope dummy  -0.16417  -0.15022 -0.20136 -0.32499 -0.15096 -0.15852 -0.14686 -0.08603
 [0.08567]*  [0.08982]* [0.09678]** [0.14413]** [0.08584]* [0.08673]* [0.08585]* [0.09105]
  
Parent, Industry and 
Year dummies?  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
  
Observations 34263  27516 21015 31736 34149 30696 34529 31100
R-squared 0.36  0.37 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.38
  
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Appendix A.1. (contd…) 
  
Country dropped:  Switzerland  Denmark Finland Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Sweden
  
Constant 0.36694  0.36647 0.36155 0.3652 0.36693 0.3587 0.36647 0.39923
 [0.04201]***  [0.04201]*** [0.04235]*** [0.04202]*** [0.04202]*** [0.04307]*** [0.04201]*** [0.04448]***
  
ETR 0.3801  0.38275 0.37411 0.38752 0.38216 0.38416 0.38275 0.2134
 [0.04944]***  [0.04947]*** [0.05007]*** [0.04947]*** [0.04947]*** [0.04955]*** [0.04947]*** [0.05430]***
  
TANG -0.0344  -0.03388 -0.03293 -0.03365 -0.03381 -0.03095 -0.03388 -0.03799
 [0.01528]**  [0.01529]** [0.01564]** [0.01528]** [0.01528]** [0.01539]** [0.01529]** [0.01581]**
  
SIZE 0.01733  0.0173 0.01802 0.01732 0.01727 0.01772 0.0173 0.01784
 [0.00179]***  [0.00179]*** [0.00181]*** [0.00179]*** [0.00179]*** [0.00181]*** [0.00179]*** [0.00186]***
  
PROFIT -0.0652  -0.06517 -0.06435 -0.0651 -0.06512 -0.06445 -0.06517 -0.06732
 [0.04396]  [0.04393] [0.04548] [0.04389] [0.04390] [0.04365] [0.04393] [0.04686]
  
Credit slope dummy  -0.14661  -0.14994 -0.13898 -0.15443 -0.14939 -0.15509 -0.14994 -0.03803
 [0.08577]*  [0.08576]* [0.08617] [0.08576]* [0.08576]* [0.08600]* [0.08576]* [0.09542]
  
Parent, Industry and 
Year dummies?  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
  
Observations 34565  34577 33874 34565 34573 34174 34577 32746
R-squared 0.36  0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
  
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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